

INDIVIDUAL FLIGHT RECORD

FLYING TIME

NAME
ADDRESS
PHONENAME
ADDRESS
PHONE
TRANSFERRED FROM 1941
TO 1942
DATE
TO 1942
STATIONMONTH(S) January
GROUP 2
ORGANIZATION Lodged with Capt. E. W. Brown, Jr.
ORG.—Attached to 1st Lt. John C. Brown, Jr.
STATION, L. A. Field, Virginia

Date	Time	FLYING TIME BY AIRCRAFT TYPE					Aircraft Model Symbol	No. of flights	Flight Time Pilot	REMARKS
		Block	Home	Com.	Part-Off	Cargo				
1/1/42	1:30						H-24A	1		
1/1/42	1:40						H			
1/1/42	2:00						H	1		
1/1/42	2:10						H	2		
1/1/42	2:20						H	3		
1/1/42	2:30						H	4		
1/1/42	2:40						H	5		
1/1/42	2:50						H	6		
1/1/42	3:00						H	7		
1/1/42	3:10						H	8		
1/1/42	3:20						H	9		
1/1/42	3:30						H	10		
1/1/42	3:40						H	11		
1/1/42	3:50						H	12		
1/1/42	4:00						H	13		
1/1/42	4:10						H	14		
1/1/42	4:20						H	15		
1/1/42	4:30						H	16		
1/1/42	4:40						H	17		
1/1/42	4:50						H	18		
1/1/42	5:00						H	19		
1/1/42	5:10						H	20		
1/1/42	5:20						H	21		
1/1/42	5:30						H	22		
1/1/42	5:40						H	23		
1/1/42	5:50						H	24		
1/1/42	6:00						H	25		
1/1/42	6:10						H	26		
1/1/42	6:20						H	27		
1/1/42	6:30						H	28		
1/1/42	6:40						H	29		
1/1/42	6:50						H	30		
1/1/42	7:00						H	31		
1/1/42	7:10						H	32		
1/1/42	7:20						H	33		
1/1/42	7:30						H	34		
1/1/42	7:40						H	35		
1/1/42	7:50						H	36		
1/1/42	8:00						H	37		
1/1/42	8:10						H	38		
1/1/42	8:20						H	39		
1/1/42	8:30						H	40		
1/1/42	8:40						H	41		
1/1/42	8:50						H	42		
1/1/42	9:00						H	43		
1/1/42	9:10						H	44		
1/1/42	9:20						H	45		
1/1/42	9:30						H	46		
1/1/42	9:40						H	47		
1/1/42	9:50						H	48		
1/1/42	10:00						H	49		
1/1/42	10:10						H	50		
1/1/42	10:20						H	51		
1/1/42	10:30						H	52		
1/1/42	10:40						H	53		
1/1/42	10:50						H	54		
1/1/42	11:00						H	55		
1/1/42	11:10						H	56		
1/1/42	11:20						H	57		
1/1/42	11:30						H	58		
1/1/42	11:40						H	59		
1/1/42	11:50						H	60		
1/1/42	12:00						H	61		
1/1/42	12:10						H	62		
1/1/42	12:20						H	63		
1/1/42	12:30						H	64		
1/1/42	12:40						H	65		
1/1/42	12:50						H	66		
1/1/42	13:00						H	67		
1/1/42	13:10						H	68		
1/1/42	13:20						H	69		
1/1/42	13:30						H	70		
1/1/42	13:40						H	71		
1/1/42	13:50						H	72		
1/1/42	14:00						H	73		
1/1/42	14:10						H	74		
1/1/42	14:20						H	75		
1/1/42	14:30						H	76		
1/1/42	14:40						H	77		
1/1/42	14:50						H	78		
1/1/42	15:00						H	79		
1/1/42	15:10						H	80		
1/1/42	15:20						H	81		
1/1/42	15:30						H	82		
1/1/42	15:40						H	83		
1/1/42	15:50						H	84		
1/1/42	16:00						H	85		
1/1/42	16:10						H	86		
1/1/42	16:20						H	87		
1/1/42	16:30						H	88		
1/1/42	16:40						H	89		
1/1/42	16:50						H	90		
1/1/42	17:00						H	91		
1/1/42	17:10						H	92		
1/1/42	17:20						H	93		
1/1/42	17:30						H	94		
1/1/42	17:40						H	95		
1/1/42	17:50						H	96		
1/1/42	18:00						H	97		
1/1/42	18:10						H	98		
1/1/42	18:20						H	99		
1/1/42	18:30						H	100		
1/1/42	18:40						H	101		
1/1/42	18:50						H	102		
1/1/42	19:00						H	103		
1/1/42	19:10						H	104		
1/1/42	19:20						H	105		
1/1/42	19:30						H	106		
1/1/42	19:40						H	107		
1/1/42	19:50						H	108		
1/1/42	20:00						H	109		
1/1/42	20:10						H	110		
1/1/42	20:20						H	111		
1/1/42	20:30						H	112		
1/1/42	20:40						H	113		
1/1/42	20:50						H	114		
1/1/42	21:00						H	115		
1/1/42	21:10						H	116		
1/1/42	21:20						H	117		
1/1/42	21:30						H	118		
1/1/42	21:40						H	119		
1/1/42	21:50						H	120		
1/1/42	22:00						H	121		
1/1/42	22:10						H	122		
1/1/42	22:20						H	123		
1/1/42	22:30						H	124		
1/1/42	22:40						H	125		
1/1/42	22:50						H	126		
1/1/42	23:00						H	127		
1/1/42	23:10						H	128		
1/1/42	23:20						H	129		
1/1/42	23:30						H	130		
1/1/42	23:40						H	131		
1/1/42	23:50						H	132		
1/1/42	24:00						H	133		
1/1/42	24:10						H	134		
1/1/42	24:20						H	135		
1/1/42	24:30						H	136		
1/1/42	24:40						H	137		
1/1/42	24:50						H	138		
1/1/42	25:00						H	139		
1/1/42	25:10						H	140		
1/1/42	25:20						H	141		
1/1/42	25:30						H	142		
1/1/42	25:40						H	143		
1/1/42	25:50						H	144		
1/1/42	26:00						H	145		
1/1/42	26:10						H	146		
1/1/42	26:20						H	147		
1/1/42	26:30						H	148		
1/1/42	26:40						H	149		
1/1/42	26:50						H	150		
1/1/42	27:00						H	151		
1/1/42	27:10						H	152		
1/1/42	27:20						H	153		
1/1/42	27:30						H	154		
1/1/42	27:40						H	155		
1/1/42	27:50						H	156		
1/1/42	28:00						H	157		
1/1/42	28:10						H	158		
1/1/42	28:20						H	159		
1/1/42	28:30		</td							

INDIVIDUAL FLIGHT RECORD

MONTH(S) January 1944
GROUP 2nd Bombardment Group (H.B.)
ORGANIZATION—Assigned 96th Bomb Squadron
HORG.—Attached for flying ATAC
STATION Bellin, Florida

1977-1978
C. P. M. 1977-1978
C. P. M. 1977-1978
C. P. M. 1977-1978

NOTE: On the next two questions, indicate by an appropriate check mark (either Yes or No) whether the individual is entitled to protection from the appropriate organization under Title III of the Civil Rights Act.

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INDIVIDUAL FLIGHT RECORD

HEAVIER THAN AIR

NAME: John Courtney, Lieutenant, U.S. Army
 RANK: Lieutenant U.S. Army
 COMM. RATING: Flight (4-1-50)
 TRANSFERRED FROM 50th Bomb Sq., 2nd Bomb Gp.
 TO: DATE: February 19
 GROUP: ORGANIZATION-Assigned
 ORG.-Attached to ACPC
 STATION: A. B. B. Bolling Field, D. C.

1	2	3						5	6	7	8
		4	5	6	7	8	9				
Time	Flight Number	FLIGHT TYPE & AIRPLANE TYPE						10	11	12	13
		Aircraft	Model	Time	Present	Cargo	Destination				
2-20	1-1	2115						B-24A	1		Melang-Bandoeng
6-20	"	2115						B-24A	1		Bandoeng-Melang
7-20	"	2115						B-24A	1		Melang-Bandoeng
10-20	"	0125						B-24A	2		Bandoeng-Jogjakarta
11-20	"	2125						B-24A	1		-Bandoeng-Bandoen-Darwin
12-20	"	0130						"	1		Darwin-Melbourne
23-20	2-5	1115						"	1		Local at Melbourne
24-20	"	1130						"	1		Local at Melbourne
25-20	"	0110						"	2		Melbourne-Broome
26-20	"	0115						"	2		Broome-Djokarta
27-20	"	0115						"	2		Djokarta-Broome
28-20	"	0110						"	1		Broome-Broome
29-20	"	1215						"	1		Local at Broome
30-20	"	1215						"	2		Broome-Djokarta-Broome

14	15	16						17	18	19	20
		Total	10	11	12	13	14				
This report		76*30						76*30			
Previous report to F. T.		218*40						218*40	13*35		
Total time since report		325*10						325*10	13*35		
Total previous report	16*45	15334*05	0100	5100	231*15	218*40	501*45				
Total to date	26*45	15334*09	0100	5100	231*15	218*40	519*20				

16-20
17-20
18-20
19-20
20-20

NOTE: This section is designed for no-explosive aircraft
than that to which the individual is assigned or assigned for flying
over the object represented under Item 20, Item 20.

ORIGINAL

WING COMMANDER
Group Leader
Commander, 14th Wing

INDIVIDUAL FLIGHT RECORD

RECORDS OF FLIGHTS

NAME: BATTEN, Francis H.
RANK: Captain, A.A.F.
AIRCRAFT RATING: Pilot: 6-30-32
TRANSFERRED FROM:

TO: DATE:

MONTH(S): June 1942
GROUP: 2nd Bombardment Group (R)
ORGANIZATION: assigned 96th Bomb Squadron (X)
ORG.—Attached for Flying:
STATION: Langley Field, Virginia

1	2	3	FLIGHT TIME BY AIRPLANE TYPE					4	5	6	7	8	
Time	Date	Flight Number	Aircraft	Hours	Min	Passenger	Cargo	Time	Assembly Model Number	No of Pass. Pilot	Flight Time Pilot	Comments	
08	12	U-4		1	00				B-105	6		Local	
08	12	O-5		2	30				B-17E	1		"	
11	12	O-2		5	20					1		"	
11	12	O-5		2	05					1		Mitchel-LF	
14	12	O-2		0	40					1		Local	
12	12	O-5		2	45					1		LF-Mitchel	
15	12	O-5		3	00					1		LF-Mitchel	
12	12	O-5		1	00					1		Mitchel-Visitor	
12	12	O-5		1	30					1		Local-Visitor-LF	
12	12	O-5		1	40					1		Local	
12	12	O-2		6	25					1		"	
15	12	O-2		2	10					1		LF-Mitchel	
20	12	O-2		11	10					1		Mitchel-Mitchel	
TOTALS													
This report													
Previous report for 1-1													
Total for field year													
Total service year													
Total to date													

NOTE:
1=Passenger
2=Flight crew
3=Flight observer
4=Flight engineer
5=Radio operator
6=Navigator
7=Bombardier
8=Photographer
9=Passenger
10=Command Pilot

REMARKS: When the window is occupied by an administrative officer
other than the pilot the administrative officer is attached for flying
and the service representative takes his place in the window.

1=Command Pilot

ORIGINAL

Not in SWPA in March

89

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CLINICAL

SAFETY: When the money is passed to an organization which has had to work the territory is honored as achieved for being over the territory organization with whom it comes to a.

U.S. AIR FORCE
Form 1000-1
Effective 1 May 1950

INDIVIDUAL FLIGHT RECORD

NAME *John S. O'Farrell* MONTH(S) *0-1922-35-6*
RANK *1st Lieutenant* DAY *10 MAY*
ACMO. UNIT/NO. *100-100000* GROUP *3*
TRANSFERRED FROM *100-100000* ORGANIZATION *Assigned*
TO *100-100000* ORG—Responsible for Flying *100-100000*
STATION *McKeesport, PA*

Date	Type	FLIGHT TIME BY AIRPLANE TYPE						Aircraft Number Assigned	No. of Flight Logs	Other Time Logs	Remarks
		Passenger	Freight	Other	Pilot	Cargo	Training				
1	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
2	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
3	10	20:00						A-17A	2		OP-100000
4	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
5	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
6	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
7	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
8	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
9	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
10	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
11	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
12	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
13	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
14	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
15	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
16	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
17	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
18	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
19	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
20	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
21	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
22	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
23	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
24	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
25	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
26	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
27	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
28	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
29	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
30	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
31	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
32	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
33	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
34	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
35	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
36	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
37	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
38	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
39	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
40	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
41	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
42	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
43	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
44	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
45	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
46	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
47	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
48	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
49	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
50	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
51	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
52	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
53	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
54	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
55	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
56	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
57	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
58	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
59	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
60	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
61	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
62	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
63	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
64	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
65	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
66	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
67	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
68	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
69	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
70	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
71	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
72	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
73	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
74	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
75	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
76	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
77	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
78	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
79	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
80	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
81	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
82	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
83	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
84	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
85	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
86	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
87	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
88	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
89	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
90	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
91	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
92	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
93	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
94	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
95	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
96	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
97	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
98	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
99	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
100	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
101	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
102	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
103	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
104	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
105	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
106	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
107	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
108	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
109	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
110	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
111	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
112	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
113	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
114	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
115	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
116	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
117	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
118	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
119	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
120	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
121	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
122	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
123	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
124	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
125	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
126	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
127	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
128	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
129	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
130	10	20:00						A-17A	1		OP-100000
131	10	20:00</td									

U.S. AIR FORCE
FIGHTING FIVE
1962

SUPERIOR
INDIVIDUAL FLIGHT RECORD

MASTER SHEET

NAME: KIGHT, Richard S.
RANK: 1st Lieutenant, USAF
EQUIPMENT PILOT
TRANSMISSION: PHASE
TO: DATE:

MONTH(S): February

GROUP:

ORGANIZATION: assigned

ORIGIN/DESTINATION: for flying

STATION:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
Date	Mission Number	Mission Number	FLIGHT TIME AND DISTANCE				Total Flight Time Flight	MILEAGE
			Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned		
1/6	16	16					00-00	1100
7	17	17					00-00	1100
8	18	18					00-00	1100
9	19	19					00-00	1100
10	20	20					00-00	1100
11	21	21					00-00	1100
12	22	22					00-00	1100
13	23	23					00-00	1100
14	24	24					00-00	1100
15	25	25					00-00	1100
16	26	26					00-00	1100
17	27	27					00-00	1100
18	28	28					00-00	1100
19	29	29					00-00	1100
20	30	30					00-00	1100
21	31	31					00-00	1100
22	32	32					00-00	1100
23	33	33					00-00	1100
24	34	34					00-00	1100
25	35	35					00-00	1100
26	36	36					00-00	1100
27	37	37					00-00	1100
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THE SIXTEEN LIBERATORS¹⁾

The delivery to Cairo of sixteen Liberator II's (LB-30's or B-24A's)²⁾ seems like a small undertaking when looked back upon from the point of view of the Air Transport Command's later achievements. When General Arnold directed the Command to carry out this operation in October 1941, it was in fact an important "first" marked throughout by elements which were to be characteristic of its later operations. Until then our deliveries had been to "the point of ultimate take-off" within the Western Hemisphere as described in the President's directive. No deliveries by military crews had been made outside of North America. Not only would this be the first delivery beyond the continent, but also the first of combat aircraft in combat condition to the theatre of action, and the first over the South Atlantic to Africa, a route which was only beginning to be explored, by the Command and by Pan-American Airways.

In carrying out its task the Command ran into and solved problems and difficulties which were to be characteristic. The complexity of supporting arrangements for an operation of this type were beautifully --even infuriatingly -- illustrated. And with Pearl Harbor this type was to

1) The basic reference for this account is the file "16 LB-30's" in Central files, HQ/AFATC. This contains all messages and correspondence referred to, except the President's letters to the Secretary of War. Personal information was received from Colonel George F. Brewer and Lieutenant Colonel Louis T. Reichert, whose activities are described in the text, and also from Mr. David Lehman, who was at that time Chief Clerk of the Ferrying Command and who was a passenger on the second Liberator delivered.

2) Following the usage of the period under consideration, these aircraft will be referred to as "Liberators". That designation was used to denote the English modification of the Consolidated four-engine bomber, while B-24 denoted the American modification.

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become its common occupation. It had, too, the relationship to important, broad strategic plans and the resulting urgency which was constantly to appear thereafter.

The background of General Arnold's directive is one of high military and political considerations. In the end of September 1941, the British in the Middle East were holding the German-Italian forces along the Egyptian frontier after a severe defeat. At Tobruk the resistance of the isolated Australians was becoming world-famous. The pacification of Iraq had recently been completed, the re-occupation of Syria had been carried out and was being consolidated, and the British and Russians were in the process of establishing themselves in Persia. Mopping-up operations in Italian-dominated East Africa were not yet finished.

British prestige in the Near East had recovered from its lowest ebb, but it was far from high. At the same time these varied operations had required a dangerous dispersal of forces, especially of aircraft, leaving the Empire forces in Egypt confined to an active defense.

The German offensive against Russia had been slowed, but pressure continued severe against Leningrad and in the South and they were just mounting the great, final assault of 1941 on Moscow.

In this atmosphere General Brett, on the completion of his inspection of the Middle East, had the following cablegram sent to the War Department under date of September 29th, 1941, received early in the morning of October 1st:

"From Brett for Arnold is this cable. Careful surveys and discussions show that equipment for Russia should be rationed, and besides

and that in making sorties from their bases on the Canal to Benghazi, Wellingtons had to refuel en route, which would be unnecessary for the four-motored planes. He asked for delivery of one Squadron, sixteen planes, and that all the ferrying crews should remain to give instruction in their use. The planes should arrive fully armed and ready for action, equipped with Sperry bomb-sights. Spare parts and supplies should be shipped to Suez by water at once.

This information General Brett conveyed to General Arnold by cable on October 17th. The War Department's decision was quick and favorable, with the only exception that we could not leave sixteen crews for instruction, but would leave four crews to remain for one month. The following day the Ferrying Command was notified. The British were requested to authorize the British Aircraft Commission to divert the sixteen Liberators and were asked to specify their destination.

The mission was now the Ferrying Command's, which at that time, in addition to its operations within North America, was working on the delivery of ninety Stinson Reliant trainers to the R. A. F. at Trinidad, and on October 6th had been asked to handle delivery by the South Atlantic Route of seven hundred North American Mitchell bombers, twenty-five Lockheed Hudsons, and all Martin 187's coming available prior to March 19th, 1942. These requirements did not involve ferrying an excessive number of planes at one time, but maintaining a steady flow as they came off the assembly lines. Operations beyond Miami would be largely in the hands of Pan-American Air Ferries, which was then beginning to survey the route from Natal to Cairo.

the Russians want activity in other zones to relieve pressure. Under present circumstances it is held that the Middle East would be the best place for such activity. Examining the records discloses that deliveries of heavy aircraft for the coming four months is entirely limited to Great Britain. In view of this, unless otherwise instructed, shall on arriving in London recommend that 20 Liberators be diverted to the Middle East from the U. S. immediately, these to be used for day and night operations against suitable targets, with British crews. The radius of action is ideal here for this aircraft . . . They will be placed in operation as fast as transition can be given to the crews, probably within a week after their arrival.

"This is not a sympathetic move, but in view of political and military situation am sure it will steady the political situation locally and in the Middle East and offer the only means of offensive action instead of a plan of steady defense."³⁾

The emphasis which General Brett gave to assurances that the Liberators would be well and fully used probably relates to the fact that our General Staff knew that the British were skeptical of these planes, and had not made full use of them in Great Britain.

On arrival in London, after consultation with Ambassador Winant, General Brett took up his proposal with the Prime Minister, who strongly approved of it, and then with Air Chief Marshall Portal, Chief of the Air Staff. In a memorandum to General Brett, Air Chief Marshall Portal pointed out that Liberators would be able to carry 8,000 pounds of bombs on each sortie, as against the 2,000 pounds capacity of the Wellingtons then in use.

3) Paraphrased.

Having an important bearing on the new undertaking was the fact that on October 7th, Colonel Caleb V. Haynes completed the first round trip of the South Atlantic shuttle between Washington and Cairo, and on this day, October 18th, Lieutenant Louis T. Reichers landed at Bolling Field at the end of the historic Trip 15 of the North Atlantic Division, having flown from U. K. to Moscow, thence home via Cairo and Natal. The information gained by these two flights was priceless. Lieutenant Reichers' narrative, especially, emphasizes the relatively primitive conditions of the trans-African route.⁴⁾

A skeleton list of the activities to be carried out in support of the new mission is impressive. It was necessary:

1. To plan the operation so as to interfere as little as possible with the flow of Liberators and other aircraft to Montreal for ferrying to the United Kingdom. As the British Aircraft Commission pointed out, the period of good weather over the North Atlantic route was growing short, and should be fully exploited.
2. To find and assemble the sixteen planes.
3. To check them for making a flight for which their capacity was not fully known, and equip them accordingly.
4. For the first time to prepare a full list of equipment for this new type of operation and assemble it for installation along a domestic route which had not previously been used for this type of plane.
5. To clear the somewhat complex question of transfer of title, from the British to the United States and back, and related to this, settle arrangements for payments for special installations, equipping and other work involved.
6. To ensure that return ferrying would be available for the crews, through the service Pan-American was in the process of developing.
7. To secure an amendment to the President's directive of October 3d, 1941, under which the Command was then operating, to permit ferrying to Africa.

4) Flight Report, Trip 16. Lieutenant Louis T. Reichers.

8. To make sure that fuel and oil would be available at all points along the route.

Some of these requirements involved many factors. In regard to the planes' capacity and special equipment for the flight, accurate information had to be secured on the African airdromes. This proved unexpectedly difficult. If the Jeswang Airdrome at Bathurst, Gambia, 1,652 miles from Natal⁵⁾ or the Waterloo Airdrome at Freetown, Sierra Leone (1,821 miles) could be used, extra tanks might not be necessary, but if the flight had to be made to Accra, a distance of 2,441 miles from Natal, they would be necessary.

Upon the matter of diplomatic arrangements for passage through the South American Republics hinged matters which might result in vexatious delay. If the Liberators would be allowed passage only as civilian, American aircraft they would carry American insignia and carry their guns as cargo. If they could go as unarmed, military aircraft, British or American, their guns must be shipped separately, by clipper, and their marking must correspond to the nationality. If they could go as armed military planes, they could fly with their guns installed.

The problem of securing crews was eased by the coincidence that on October 18th the North Atlantic Division's shuttle service was temporarily suspended, pending winterization of its aircraft and other improvements. This released eight B-24 crews, which made it possible to fill the complement of sixteen -- eighty men -- without interfering with continental deliveries for the United Kingdom. Arrangements were made with the Combat

5) Distances according to the Route Manual of July 22, 1942.

fuel from the auxiliaries to the main tank, with no provision in case this should fail.

By fast, firm action, Lt. Reichers got the installation changed back to his approved plan in record time. The first Liberator left the plant November 13th, the second on the 14th, with two more to follow in short order.

While all this was going on, the Command was attending to the varied matters previously listed, as well as arranging such items as inoculating the crews with the serums necessary for the extreme tropics, securing passports, and so forth. It was also in this sixth month of its existence installing a shuttle service to Cairo, opening and staffing a delivery route through Cairo to Russia, developing plans for China, working on the far Northern route, and carrying out its routine activities. On November 24th the President issued his "blank check" directive authorizing extension of deliveries "to such other places and in such manner as may be necessary to carry out the Lend-Lease program", an enlargement of scope which could be made greater by nothing short of war.

The matter of the auxiliary tanks is stressed because it exemplifies the incongruity of making an urgent movement by air dependent on slow, overland (or over-water) transportation, and the necessity, increasingly recognized later, of equipping an organization established for the purpose of achieving high-speed, air-borne delivery (whether of bombs upon a target, or personnel or freight to combat zones, or of the aircraft themselves), with the authority and means to support itself or to be supported by air. It happened by chance that after December 12th we were well able

to use for ourselves the planes whose delivery had thus been held up, but that is hardly even a palliation. Setting that aside, between getting a full squadron of heavy bombers to Cairo, their crews trained and ready to go, early in December, or not until sometime in 1942, the difference was made first by the difficulty of securing accurate, technical information from other than the Command's own sources, and secondly and more importantly, by tying the operation to the ground.

Liberator Number One, under Lieutenant E. D. Reynolds, departed from Bolling Field November 21st, arriving at Boringuen, P. R. the same day. Their route was laid out as Boringuen - Natal - Accra - Kano - El Fasher - Cairo. (Some of the planes delivered stopped at Khartoum.) The flight as far as Belem, where Pan American services were utilized, was uneventful with the exception that the high frequency radio failed during flight from Boringuen to Belem. Although the high frequency radio was not functioning, because of the high priority of the mission, Lieutenant Reynolds elected to continue the flight to Natal on the 23rd of November. A successful flight to Natal was accomplished, but no maintenance assistance could be obtained, nor were there any technicians available that were qualified to perform trouble-shooting on the equipment installed on the Liberator.

In addition to the absence of technical assistance, there was also a complete lack of needed flight information, because a meteorological advisory and reporting system had not been established

on the east coast of South America. A decision to continue the flight without the desired flight and weather information and without high frequency radio aid was again made on the basis of the priority of the mission. At that time, the political situation at Natal was a difficult one, with the Italian Latif line still exerting a powerful influence.

It should be noted that the assignment of Lieutenant Matthews to this flight was for the purpose of his indoctrination and checkout. Lieutenant Matthews was a well-qualified pilot and fully capable of flying the airplane. On this basis, Lieutenant Reynolds decided to rotate flight legs with Matthews during the course of the flight. Lieutenant Matthews was in the left seat acting as pilot during the flight from Belem to Natal and based on this rotation, Lieutenant Reynolds was to fly the next leg of the mission to Accra.

They cleared from Natal that same night at 23:45 and landed at Accra, without special incident, at 13:00 o'clock on November 24th. This was the first American plane to land at that field, and it was given an excellent reception. The radio was still completely out of order and no replacement parts could be provided in Accra.

Although the station agent of Pan American had suggested that the flight to El Fasher be undertaken during hours of darkness, in order to facilitate navigation, Lieutenant Reynolds decided to undertake the flight from Accra to El Fasher (omitting Kano as

unnecessary) during daylight hours and without radio in view of the excellent work his navigator-bombadier team had done to date. Again, the decision was made in order to compress the flight time to Cairo as much as possible.

They departed at 06:15 on November 25th, and up to this point, the basic navigation had been achieved by means of dead reckoning, and confirmed by celestial means. The success of the flight from the U. S. to Accra was the result of excellent team effort between the navigator and bombardier. The bombardier used the installed Sperry bomb sight as the instrument for determining drifts. Complete absence of meteorological information across Central Africa prevented the Commander from knowing that almost the entire route was covered by heavy ground haze and blowing sand. This condition prevented accurate drift readings, and the dead reckoning that could be accomplished was that of plotting a course and flying it without being able to apply compensating drifts and hoping that varying winds would balance any drifts to the right or left of course. Inasmuch as the course was due east, the accurate speed lines could be determined via celestial navigation, i. e., moving sun lines forward. Accurate fixex on east-west courses prove highly inaccurate in determining precise positions. Late that afternoon, they discovered that they were lost. This the Commander attributes to two things: First, the difficult navigation conditions, and the fact that El Fasher was plotted incorrectly on the navigation chart. After two hours of cruising in search of that

field, Lieutenant Reynolds took over the navigation. (The co-pilot, Lieutenant Matthews, had been acting as pilot since leaving Accra, and continued to do so). A flight pattern was established at low cruise and maximum economy over a fixed position on the ground, identified by a nomad campfire. As soon as it became sufficiently dark and a fix on the stars could be obtained, Lieutenant Reynolds plotted their position as somewhere between 150 and 175 miles south and east of El Fasher.

Feeling that the fix was a reliable one, Lieutenant Reynolds decided to plot a course for El Fasher and after flying out the time period to where El Fasher should have been, there was nothing but abysmal darkness, with but a few scattered nomad campfires. Since fuel was becoming critical, the Commander chose to seek El Obeid further east, rather than set up a search pattern for El Fasher, since, if forced down by lack of gas, which was running low, in the

latter case he would have had to attempt a night landing on the desert or parachute jump. Heading east, had they missed El Obeid, they still had a fair chance of continuing to the edge of the Nile, where a landing on its banks could be attempted.

As it was, Reynolds' navigation proved accurate and they flew directly to the town of El Obeid; however, the arrival was about 20 minutes early because of the erroneously plotted position. El Obeid was easily identified, but the landing field had no markings. A flare dropped from 10,000 feet gave no results, but another from 3,000 feet showed them the airdrome. By now, their gas was dangerously low, well below the point at which Lieutenant Reichers had warned them that stoppage of the feed-line by the self-sealing lining might occur.

Two cars drove towards the airdrome, attempting to signal the proper runway and direction. A combination of slight dust haze and a low moon, made visibility poor, which was not helped by the fact that the Liberator's left landing light was out. Four drag approaches were made over the field in an attempt to get the orientation of the runway straight. By this time, gasoline was down to fifty gallons according to the gage. By good fortune, the feed-line did not choke in this case, but the pilot and co-pilot were not unnaturally worried.

On their last approach, they got their bearings and saw that the cars and people who had come out had aligned themselves on the right hand side of the runway. They made a wide circle; while they did this, three or four hurricane lanterns, used for house lighting, were set out. The fliers thought that these lanterns were also on the right side of the runway since the cars had been parked on the right.

This assumption turned out to be incorrect because, evidently, someone had joined the ground party that knew something about aviation and had caused them to put the lanterns on the left side of the runway. Since the left hand landing light was out, Lieutenant Reynolds elected to remain in the right seat. Although Lieutenant Matthews was in the pilot's position, Lieutenant Reynolds retained command of the airplane and the decision to land was made by him. They were unable to determine the exact position of the lights until crossing the threshold of the runway, and were within approximately 30 to 50 feet of the ground before being able to determine that the runway was, actually, to the right of the lights.

Lieutenant Reynolds could see the runway and also see the shoulder for some distance to the left of the runway. The shoulder appeared to be equally as good as the runway and he instructed Lieutenant Matthews to land. In fact, the shoulder was equally as good as the runway, or for that matter, the entire area was one large runway with the exception that, on the landing surface, the brush had been cleared away.

Unfortunately, what Lieutenant Matthews could not see until it was too late, was that a construction ditch of some sort had been dug to the left of the left shoulder and a four foot mound of dirt had been thrown up as a result of the ditch being dug. The left wheel dropped into the ditch and numbers 1 and 2 props hit into the mound of dirt. The plane turned to the left into the bank and broke off the left wheel, resulting in a ground loop to the left breaking off both the nose wheel and right wheel.

The crew was uninjured, and arranged shortly thereafter to continue to Cairo.

It seems tragic that the end of so much effort should be a crash at an obscure way station, particularly after the resourcefulness and responsibility of the officer in charge. This was a pioneer trip in many senses, along a route which seems chiefly notable for its lack of facilities.

The remaining three Liberators equipped with the tanks flown to San Diego were safely delivered by December 10th, and were followed by one more. The remainder were turned back at Miami or intermediate domestic stations, when the attack upon Pearl Harbor occurred, to take part in the yet more urgent movement of planes to the Indies and to meet their end, fighting, in that desperate campaign.

The movement as carried out boils down to something relatively small and disappointingly slow. Yet its importance remains. In view of the total novelty of the undertaking and the obstacles presented by factors beyond the Command's control, what was achieved, and the fact that a steady flow of planes had been established, even though it was then cut off for high strategic reasons, makes the operation not only a valuable experience, but truly creditable.

C. 2nd 16 Liberator Project

Until October 1941, plans for ferrying aircraft to the British over the South Atlantic route went no further than the employment of a civilian contract organization to perform the work. In that month a significant change in policy took place when General Arnold directed the Ferrying Command to make preparations for the ferrying of 16 Liberator bombers (LB-20's) to the British at Cairo, using military crews of the Army Air Corps.²¹ Until that time ferrying Command deliveries had been to "the point of ultimate take-off" within the Western Hemisphere as directed by the President. No deliveries by military crews had been made outside of North America. Not only would this be the first deliveries beyond the continent, but also the first combat aircraft in combat condition to be ferried to an active theater, and the first combat aircraft to be flown over the South Atlantic to Africa. In retrospect it seems a small undertaking, as indeed it was; it appears even less important when one considers that only five of the aircraft actually departed the United States before the Pearl Harbor attack forced the diversion of the remainder elsewhere. But it was in fact an important "first," a pioneer undertaking marked throughout by elements that were to be characteristic of later ferrying operations over the route.

21. Memo AGFC for Arnold, Oct 20, 1941, "Availability of Personnel for Ferrying 16 LB-20 Airplanes to Africa," in "Liberators (16)," Candyce File, AGC Central File; AGFC "Daily Diary," Oct 20, 21, 1941, in AGC Historical File.

The background of General Arnold's directive is one of high military and political considerations. At the end of September 1943, the British in the Middle East were holding the Suez-Culmán Canal along the Egyptian frontier after a severe defeat. The pacification of Iraq had recently been completed, the re-occupation of Syria had been carried out and was being consolidated, and the British and Russians were in the process of establishing themselves in Iran. Campaigns in Italy-occupied East Africa were not yet finished. These varied operations had required a enormous amount of effort, especially of aircraft, leaving the Empire forces in Egypt confined to an active defense. To break the great German offensive continued and though checked at El Alamein here and there, it had not yet been stopped as it was to be a few months later before the gates of Rome. At this critical point in the battle for Russia, the Allies were searching for every possible cause, even of the most indirect sort, for mounting diversionary attacks to relieve the pressure on the hard pressed Red Army.

In this situation Major General George H. Brett, then commanding an Airforce of the Middle East, reached the conclusion that George's Liberators, with their wide radius of action, would provide the best and quickest means of attacking the Germans in southern Europe, of strengthening the political position of the Allies locally, and of taking definite offensive action against the forces of General Pétain. Before departing Cairo for London he informed General Arnold of his intention of recommending to British authorities that 20 of the Liberators earmarked for service in the British Isles be diverted to

the Middle East. On his arrival in London General Brett found that the Prince of Wales and Mr Chico Marshall, Col Charles Portal entirely sympathetic and even enthusiastic. The latter asked for the delivery of 16 aircrafts, the initial equipment of one aircraft, and requested that the flying crews remain to give instruction to their men. The planes were to arrive fully armed and ready for action, equipped with the necessary bombloads. An initial stock of spare parts and supplies was to be sent out by way of the Pan American transport service, and the remainder was to be shipped by water to Cairo. This proposal General Brett conveyed on October 17 to General Arnold, who gave his hearty approval. He indicated, however, that it would be impossible to leave 16 aircrafts in Egypt; A few days earlier was the best that could be done.

The task of making the preliminary arrangements, providing the crews, and carrying the bombers to Cairo devolved upon the General Staff, Forward. A detailed list of the necessary steps taken in support of the new mission to Egypt. It was necessary, for example, to find available crews, to find the places either at the factory or enroute to Britain that could be released, to check them for a flight for which their capacity was not fully known and equip them accordingly, to prepare and assemble the full list of equipment required for aircraft and crews in this entirely new type of operation, to clear the exact and complex questions of transfer of title from the

22. Reg 103, Rollers to HILDE (Brett for Arnold), Sep 29, 1941; msg 722, Brett to 270 (for Arnold), Oct 17, 1941; msg Arnold to Brett, Oct 19 / 27, 1941, in "Liberators (16)", 9 Comint's File, AD Central Files.

British to the United States and back, to make proper diplomatic arrangements with neutral countries en route, to insure that crews would be returned promptly by air, to make certain that runways of landing fields en route would be able to accommodate heavy bombers and that fuel and oil would be available at all points, and, finally, to assure an amendment to the President's directive of October 9, 1941, under which the Command was then operating, to permit ferrying by military crews to Africa.

The problem of securing crews was eased by the coincidence that on October 10 the Ferrying Command's shuttle service over the North Atlantic to Great Britain was suspended, temporarily if not indefinitely at the time, pending winterization of the aircraft and the improvement of weather and communications facilities. This released 8 B-24 crews, and made it possible to fill the required complement of 16 crews without interfering with the continental deliveries of Liberators from the San Diego factory to Canada. Arrangements were made with the Combat Command to provide four bombardiers, experts in the operation of the heavy bombardier and qualified instructors, for the first four crews. In order to assure the prompt return to the United States of the ferrying crews, other than those which were to be retained as instructors, the Command was prepared to establish a South Atlantic shuttle service to Cairo, using the B-24's awaiting winterization for the resumption of North Atlantic operations. This transport service

was established the following month shortly before the takeoff of the
first of the 16 Liberators.

In the matter of equipping the planes properly for the long journey, a number of factors were involved. Accurate information had to be obtained on the condition of the airfields along the west coast of Africa before the question could be settled as to whether it was necessary to equip the aircraft with extra gas tanks, a time-consuming process. If the Jeddah airfield at Bathurst, Gambia, (1,812 miles from Natal), or the Dakar airfield at Freetown, Sierra Leone (1,621 miles) could be used, extra tanks might not be necessary. Even this was not certain, for unofficial information (donated, however, by the Material Division of the Air Corps) indicated that the self-sealing lining of the Liberator tanks tended to collapse and block the feed-line when the gas tanks in the tanks fell below 200 to 250 gallons. If the landing fields at Bathurst and Freetown were not usable, and it was necessary to make the flight to Asmara, a distance of 2,441 miles from Natal, there was no question but that the time had to be taken to find and install the

29. Memo AFPC for C/AMP, Oct 23, 1941, "Suspension of Air Corps Ferrying Command Operations over the South Atlantic," in AM 23, AMP Classified Files; memo AFPC for Arnold, Oct 26, 1941, "Availability of Personnel for Ferrying 16 B-10 Airplanes to Africa;" msg 925, Brett to WAC (for Arnold), Oct 30, 1941, "Re AFPC to Chief Intel Div, Env 3, 1941, "Cablegram," in Liberators (24), Conn's File, AFCS Central Files. For establishment of South Atlantic shuttle service, see part, p 110-111, 113-114.

African Airfields. To land at Accra (the point finally selected), 750 gallons extra capacity was needed for each airplane, but here was an engineering problem that had to be solved from scratch, for tank bay tanks for Liberators did not exist. After considerable experimental investigation, it was decided that the installation of tank bay Martin B-58's in sets of three was practicable, and offered the only means of supplying the extra capacity by using tanks already in existence. These could be secured by removing them from the B-58's in the theater pool at the British plant in Bahrain. Through the External Division, the Purchasing Committee arranged to obtain 43 of these, a supply tank and seven additional being shipped by air to the Concentrated Factory at San Diego and the remainder by ground freight. The first tank installation was completed aboard of this on December 32 and the plane left the factory for Palling Field the following day.

Both C_2 and C_3 were highly developed, the former can have

altitude of both Brazil and Venezuela, the planes were able to take off as fully armed American military aircraft, although such flights were not permitted. The latter condition would have been enforced in any case inasmuch as the ~~medium~~ bomb run gassing facilities at Balas and Petal made it impossible to accommodate more than two planes a day.

Presidential authority to extend the carrying service of the Convair was obtained on October 27. In a letter to the Secretary of War on that date the President authorized the delivery of "one to any point within the African continent." On November 21, forty days after the first of the Liberators departed the United States, the President issued a "blank check" directive authorizing delivery of Liberators "to such other places and in such manner as may be necessary to carry out the Torch-Plan program," an enlargement of authority which could be made greater by nothing short of war.

26. MA 6/48 to CG/C 1st Inf, Oct 31, 1941 (1 pg), "Authorization to fly aircraft to the 1st Inf ready for 2nd Inf, 4th Inf to RA, London (See Draft), Nov 7, 1941; MA 6/47-2573, MA/ATC to CG/C 1st Inf (Draft), Nov 7, 1941, in "Liberators (16)," Comint File, ATC Central Files; MA/C AGFD MA 6/473 Oct 23, 1941, "Suspension of Air Corps Carrying Command Operations over the North Atlantic" MA 6/473 to 6/48, Oct 23, 1941 (1 pg), "Suspension of AGFD Operations over the North Atlantic," Comint 3, ATC to 6/482, Oct 7, 1941, in 373.23, ATC Classified Files; MA 6/473 MA/ATC to AGFD, Oct 23, 1941, "Terry flights through South America," in 503.1, ATC, AGFD 3, AG1, Terry 13-200, Comint File, ATC Central Files.
27. MA President to Secy Rep, Oct 29, 1941; MA President to Secy Rep, Nov 24, 1941, in 321, ATC Central Files. See note, p 142.

two aids on the airfield to signal the proper runway and direction, but the plane landed on a shoulder of the runway instead of the main part and struck a four-foot mound of earth alongside a drainage ditch. The tail was completely jarred from the plane as the left wheel then broke off. The result was a ground loop to the left which tore off the nose wheel and the right wheel. Although the crew was uninjured, it was tragic nevertheless that the end result of so much effort should have been the wreck of a valuable and surely needed airplane in the African desert, so great distance from its final destination. The Liberator was later salvaged by the British; meanwhile the crew was flown on to Cairo in another plane to assist in getting up a new program for the British.²¹

Four other aircraft of the 16 Liberator Project departed the United States by December 7, and all four were delivered safely to Cairo. Following the Pearl Harbor attack, the remaining two turned back at Elseni or intermediate composite stations to become a part of a yet more urgent program of heavy bombers to the Far East for the relief of the Philippines. Here they met their end in the courageous effort during the early months of the war to hold the Japanese in the Dutch East Indies.²²

21. 11/11/32-11/12/32, B. B. Cafres to CG Air Secs E3 Hill to African Director, 11/12/32, 1932, transmitted Operating Program as 12-30 Appendix 62 2nd Appendix, B-7, Paying Egypt, 11/12/32, CG Air Secs E302-110 Carrying Trip 11-3, Ops File, A-3 Central File.

22. Cafres, "South Atlantic Trip 10-3, Return Paying Egypt 11-3, Director, 11/12/32-11/13/32, 11/13/32, 1932, "South Atlantic Trip 11-3-3, Return Paying Trip 11-3 Robert A. Fins, "South Atlantic Paying Trip 11-3-3, 11/13/32 Report," in B-3,5, South Atlantic Carrying Trip 11-3, Ops File, A-3 Central File.

Reynolds, E.O.

INDIVIDUAL FLIGHT RECORD

RECEIVED THIS DAY
NAME: Reynolds, Robert E., O-21570 MONTH: June 1968
RANK: 1st Lieutenant, AF CPT GROUP: 442
RIBBON PERIOD: 1968 ORGANIZATION: 442nd CBT Sqd, 17th ABW
TRANSMISSION FROM: ORG: - Attached for flying
TO: STATION: Bunker Field, Florida, 33434-5200 DATE: 1968

Wavy Eyebrows

4-1995-When the witness is asked to say something other than that he / she has consented to answer or not, he / she may then give his / her own explanation. *Example:* witness A

◎ 人物

Reynolds, Albert D.

INDIVIDUAL FLIGHT RECORD

1984-1985
1985-1986
1986-1987

NAME: Equalizer, Silver B.
RANK: 1st Lieutenant, AF/AFSC
ACRO: HATENOS 2000 00000
TRANSFERRED FROM:
TO:

SEARCHED INDEXED

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1997) en where this situation is compared to the consequences when other than the official tax legislation is concerned we consider the different tax authorities responsible under section 8.

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SUPPLEMENTAL
INDIVIDUAL FLIGHT RECORD

MANOLO MARTINEZ
MANOLO MARTINEZ
MANOLO MARTINEZ
MANOLO MARTINEZ

39472

MONTHS January GROUP 1942
ORGANIZATION—Assigned Albuquerque, N.M.
ORG—Attached to Flying ACT
STATION Holloman Field, N.M.

1977.—When older timber is assessed by the independent value, then that is a check that timber is assessed to homestead or timberland for property tax purposes, irrespective of other timberland, timber or otherwise.

Classification

Matthews, F. H.

INDIVIDUAL FLIGHT RECORD

PHOTOGRAPH BY JAMES A. GRIFFIN

NAME John L. Ladd
RICO RATING 3
TRANSFERRED FROM
TO DA

MONTH(S) December 1941
GROUP 212 Employment Group (B)
ORGANIZATION Assigned Fifth Bomb Division (B)
ORG. - Standard for flying
STATION Langley Field, Virginia

604

www.ubuntubook.org

242 V. F. on 27th May 1908, obtained a specimen of the insect from Mr. G. J. Clark of the U.S. Fish Commission, who had obtained it from Mr. W. H. Brewster, of Cambridge, Massachusetts.